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1. Introduction 
Philosophers have argued that forgiveness involves overcoming anger 
toward another who has done wrong, overcoming non-angry negative 
emotional states aimed at another who has done wrong, or (in addition to 
overcoming unhappy feelings) repudiating the belief that the wrongdoer 
remains a wrongdoer. I My contention is that forgiveness typically involves 
overcoming moral anger toward another. Not all instances of anger con- 
stitute moral anger, and thus overcoming anger does not always constitute 
forgiveness. By moral anger I mean anger partially constituted by the belief 
that you have been wrongfully harmed by another. More precisely, "moral 
anger" is anger partially constituted by the belief that (1) you have been 
wrongfully harmed, or (2) you have been wrongfully put at the risk of harm, 
or (3) you have been or are the object of an intended wrongful harm or have 
been or are the object of an intended wrongful risk of harm. These complex 
qualifications are needed to fully articulate the possible constitutive beliefs 
of moral anger. The background theory I rely upon is the view that sophisti- 
cated emotions, such as resentment, pride, love, and shame, require specific 
identificatory beliefs the lack of which would render them unintelligible. 2 
Since resentment involves the belief that you have been wrongfully harmed, 
it is a central case of moral anger; thus, forgiveness will paradigmatically 
involve the overcoming of resentment. Other forms of anger count as moral 
anger just in case the belief that you have been wrongfully harmed is 
partially constitutive of them. Since negative emotional responses to 
wrongful harm, such as disappointment, heartbreak, or depression, do not 
necessarily involve this belief, and are often less focused than are angry 
emotions, forgiveness will typically involve overcoming moral anger rather 
than some other emotion. I will defend this approach to forgiveness, 
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arguing in the process that recent alternative views fail to adequately 
articulate what is involved in forgiving. 
2. Resentment, moral agency, and overcoming moral anger 
In what sense must you have been harmed (or believe that you have been 
harmed) in order to experience moral anger toward another? Not just any 
harm will do, for moral anger is not always an appropriate response to 
having been harmed. Here I discuss resentment as the central case of moral 
anger, but I will show below that the argument applies as well to other 
instances of moral anger. 
The number of ways in which a person may be harmed is limitless. A 
person may be killed, wounded, significantly inconvenienced, or otherwise 
harmed by a natural disaster, an animal, or another person. Yet to claim that 
people resent bad weather or destructive pets or whining infants is absurd. 
Notwithstanding the fact that people often claim to resent the harms caused 
by their pets, and parents sometimes resent their offspring because they 
represent an intolerable financial or emotional burden or serve as a 
reminder of a bad relationship, the correct view is that people can only 
resent moral agents. Animals, small children, mental incompetents, and 
natural events are not moral agents. This does not mean that we can only 
resent mature, mentally competent people. Nations, corporations, and other 
collectives, which are in some sense greater than the sum of their parts, may 
be moral agents in the relevant sense, and are therefore sometimes the 
appropriate objects of resentment. Nor does it mean that we cannot be angry 
in some other (non-moral) sense on account of the harms caused by 
animals, natural events, and other non-moral agents. The point is that just as 
we can only resent moral agents, so too moral anger of any sort must be 
directed at moral agents. The conception of moral agency at issue is quite 
simple: a moral agent is an agent to whom we can sensibly ascribe moral 
responsibility. This coincides with our intuition that resentment is a moral  
response to harm, while other forms of anger need not be. This accounts, as 
well, for our intuition that forgiveness, unlike other modes of overcoming 
anger, is a moral phenomenon; that is, when done for appropriate reasons it 
is a virtue. 
But when is overcoming resentment (moral anger) forgiveness? Other 
writers have argued that overcoming resentment or forswearing negative 
feelings is forgiveness just in case it is done for a moral reason. There is 
truth in this suggestion, and we should clarify what is to count as a "moral" 
reason. But, independently of this issue, a question arises about the precise 
sense in which people must "overcome" resentment for the forswearing of 
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such negative feelings to count as forgiveness. 
Jeffrie Murphy argues that forgiveness is the virtue that helps keep 
resentment in check, yet that it is more than merely overcoming resentment. 
Murphy points out that we sometimes forget or "get bored with" our 
resentments, and in this way they dissipate. Forgetting or becoming bored 
with our resentments "just happens to us," and is hardly to be counted as a 
virtue, let alone the virtue of forgiveness. Moreover, other ways of being 
liberated from resentment, such as visiting a behavior-modification 
therapist in order to have our resentment "extinguished" (assuming for the 
sake of argument that this is possible), do not constitute forgiveness 
because forgiveness requires overcoming resentment "for a moral reason. ''3 
But while forgetting resentments (where forgetting is entirely passive) is 
hardly the exercise of the virtue of forgiveness, neither is it a case of 
overcoming resentment in the relevant sense. The concept of "overcoming" 
is ordinarily associated with such notions as "conquering," "overpowering," 
"gaining the upper hand on," or "prevailing over"; these terms suggest self- 
activity and effort. Paradigmatic examples of overcoming in this sense 
abound, as for instance when a person successfully overcomes a physical or 
mental handicap, or the debilitating psychological effects of an internalized 
stereotype, or the untoward consequences of social and economic injustice. 
These suggest that the concept of "overcoming" involves the notion of a 
person's getting beyond obstacles by her or his own efforts, or by the joint 
efforts of several people. Overcoming resentment presupposes effort or 
struggle on the part of s/he who overcomes. Forgetting is, however, a 
completely passive phenomenon, in the sense at issue, and so fails to be a 
case of overcoming anything at all. 
This does not mean that overcoming resentment simpliciter is forgive- 
ness. Murphy and other writers are correct in alluding to limits on what can 
count as cases of overcoming resentment that constitute forgiveness. The 
point these writers are making is that to forgive another is to struggle to 
overcome the anger born of having been wrongfully harmed. To forgive 
another is to engage in an internal drama: people struggle to overcome their 
resentment. This cannot be accomplished by anyone else (a surrogate 
forgiver, let us say), and its success admits of degrees. Passively to forget or 
have anger artificially excised does not involve the "moral work" necessary 
to forgive another. Forgiveness is an accomplishment; it is a mending of the 
moral fences between two persons and is the re-acceptance of another. 
3. Is forgiveness overcoming all negative feelings? 
That forgiveness is paradigmatically overcoming moral anger, of which 
334 
resentment is the central case, does not show that it is only forswearing 
moral anger. Overcoming any negative emotional state, for example, 
disappointment or sorrow, caused by and directed toward a wrongdoer 
should perhaps count as forgiveness. In the following examples I clarify my 
position and address this alternative view of what might be called the 
"scope" of forgiveness. 
Suppose Peter betrays Mary. Mary may respond by holding Peter in 
contempt, or by regarding him with disgust, or treating him scornfully. 
None of these emotional responses is resentment, the central case of moral 
anger. Yet we are inclined to think that were Mary to overcome (in the 
appropriate way) these emotional states directed at Peter she would thereby 
have forgiven him. On my account, overcoming such negative emotional 
states, if they are partially constituted by the belief that you have been 
wrongfully harmed, count as instances of forgiveness because they count as 
instances of overcoming moral anger. Thus, Mary's overcoming contempt 
or scorn for Peter is forgiveness. 
Imagine instead that Mary resents Peter's having betrayed her. In 
struggling to overcome this negative emotional state Mary succeeds. Her 
resentment, however, is replaced by scorn. Rather than wishing to wring 
Peter's neck for what he has done, Mary feels that their friendship ought to 
be abandoned because it involves a fundamental lack of mutual respect. 
This is not a case of forgiveness, for Mary's emotional state subsequent to 
overcoming resentment is itself moral anger (namely, scorn) caused by 
Peter's wrongdoing. 
Now suppose that Mary's emotional response to having been betrayed is 
disappointment or sadness rather than anger. A person may indeed over- 
come such negative emotional states (in the relevant sense of "overcome") 
and yet, on my view, this would not constitute forgiveness. This, we might 
argue, is counterintuitive. This last case suggests that forgiveness enjoys a 
much wider scope than I have allowed, and thus that my analysis is mis- 
guided. 
Norvin Richards argues that forgiveness is overcoming any negative 
emotional state caused by and aimed at another who has done you wrong. 
For Richards the aforementioned example shows a need to expand the 
definition of forgiveness so that it may include overcoming "all negative 
feelings ... of whatever kind" aimed at the person who caused "the episode 
in question." While forgiveness may involve overcoming negative emotions 
other than anger, I challenge the notion that it requires overcoming all such 
emotions. 
Anger admits of many varieties, including animosity, indignation, wrath, 
malice, contempt, and possibly disgust. This family of concepts, the "angry 
emotions," allows for instances of moral anger other than resentment just in 
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case such emotions are partially constituted by the belief that you have been 
wrongfully harmed. In arguing that moral anger includes forms of anger 
other than resentment, and thus that overcoming these types of anger may 
count as forgiveness, I have urged that the distinction between "moral 
anger" and "non-moral anger" is crucial for sorting out genuine cases of 
forgiveness from other forms of overcoming anger. I suggest that a similar 
distinction be made with regard to negative emotions other than anger the 
overcoming of which (if appropriately qualified) may count as forgiveness. 
In this way, overcoming some negative emotions other than moral anger 
may qualify as forgiveness, though as I argue below other reasons suggest 
that this is rarely the case. 
The belief that you have been wrongfully harmed is essential to the 
moral nature of forgiveness; without it, your emotional response to 
wrongdoing is morally obscure. While forms of anger other than resentment 
and, in general, other negative emotional states, may involve the belief that 
you have been wrongfully harmed, they need not. Where this belief is 
absent, overcoming those states can hardly constitute forgiveness, for there 
is nothing to forgive. Thus, overcoming non-angry negative emotions may 
constitute forgiveness if those emotions involve the belief that you have 
been wrongfully harmed. Yet overcoming frustration, heartache, depres- 
sion, disappointment, misery, or unhappiness may not constitute forgive- 
ness even when these emotional states involve the belief that you have been 
wrongfully harmed. This is so because these are emotional states that do not 
always have the requisite intentionality to focus on a wrongdoer. This is not 
to deny that such states may sometimes have "targets" (we can be disap- 
pointed in someone, or unhappy with another), just that the belief that you 
have been wrongfully harmed is less likely by itself to guarantee that such 
negative feelings as general depression, misery, heartache, or unhappiness 
are as focused or directed as are angry emotions. In other words, these 
feelings are often more diffuse and, like heartbreak and grief, must "run 
their course," but moral anger is not usually thought of as having a course 
to run. 
These complications render overcoming negative emotional states other 
than moral anger less clearly genuine cases of forgiveness, since a response 
to mistreatment with sadness, disappointment, or heartbreak may not, even 
where they are constituted in part by the belief that you have been wrong- 
fully harmed, be a change in a person's feelings f o r  another, which is of the 
essence of forgiveness. 
These differences between anger and other negative emotional states like 
sadness, disappointment, and heartbreak suggest that forgiveness need not 
involve overcoming all negative emotional states based upon a wrongdoer's 
misdeed. Moreover, forgiving another may be compatible with an abiding 
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sense of disappointment or unhappiness caused by the wrongdoer. Some- 
times people overcome their anger but remain disappointed in the 
wrongdoer or saddened by the fact that they could have been wronged in 
the first place. To suppose that such people have not forgiven those who 
have wronged them is to assume that forgiveness requires that we wipe the 
emotional slate clean, that we "feel" as if the misdeed were never com- 
mitted. This strikes me as too restrictive a requirement of forgiveness, and 
Richards's account is mistaken to the extent that it implies such a require- 
ment. The view I have been urging all along is closer to the truth of the 
matter: forgiveness is typically the overcoming of moral anger  caused by 
the wrongdoing of another and constituted in part by the belief that you 
have been wrongfully harmed. 
4. Is forgiveness the forswearing of beliefs? 
The above remarks to the effect that not all negative feelings must be 
overcome for forgiveness to take place fail to address a related question, 
namely, must the belief that another is a wrongdoer be repudiated as well? 
Jean Hampton argues that overcoming both resentment and the judgment 
that another is a wrongdoer are necessary conditions of forgiveness. 
Hampton urges: 
If ... a victim overcame resentment towards his wrongdoer for moral 
reasons (e.g., because he believed that festering resentment affected his 
ability to respond lovingly to other human beings) yet sustained the 
belief (held soberly, and not in anger) that his wrongdoer was a terrible 
person and one with whom he should not associate, we would not say 
that he had forgiven his wrongdoer, only that he was no longer angry at 
her. 4 
In other words, the definition of forgiveness as overcoming resentment 
for moral reasons is inadequate, for it does not allow us to distinguish 
forgiveness from other forms of morally motivated overcoming of resent- 
ment. Metaphors such as "bestowed upon," or "offered to," and even 
"asking for" forgiveness, imply that forgiveness is a transaction between 
two people, while other forms of overcoming anger need not be. Moreover, 
such metaphors as "to cover," "to lift up and carry away," and "to let go," 
when used to refer to the wrong that was done, are, according to Hampton, 
"metaphors for the forgiver's removal of sin from the wrongdoer, ''5 and 
these assume that forgiveness involves overcoming a "point of view," not 
merely a negative emotion such as resentment. The perspective that is 
overcome is a point of view within which the wrongdoer is seen as "the one 
who hurt me," while in the new perspective the wrongdoer is "liberated 
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from his burden of moral debt." Hampton tells us that this liberation 
restores a relationship by putting two persons on an equal footing once 
again. Furthermore, 
When the victim sends away the immoral action in the way that a 
creditor would absolve a debt, he no longer holds the immoral action 
against the wrongdoer (in the same way that a creditor would no longer 
hold the debt against the debtor). 6 
So Hampton's point is that forgiving involves overcoming a point of 
view in favor of another, different, point of view. This second perspective 
involves liberating the wrongdoer from a moral burden and absolving him 
or her of it. The point of view that is overcome 
is the product of a judgement of the other as one's transgressor, so it 
seems that it is really this judgement which a victim must let go of if he 
is going to be able to welcome that person back into his life. 7 
Thus, letting go of the judgment that the wrongdoer is a transgressor is, 
in addition to overcoming resentment, a necessary condition of forgiveness. 
I do not think that forgiveness must involve renouncing the judgment of 
another as a wrongdoer. Overcoming a point of view may involve less than 
this and still be forgiveness, as the following considerations make clear. 
Forgiving and absolving from a debt are importantly disanalogous, for 
when creditors forgive debts their doing so eliminates the debt. Forgiving, 
however, does not eradicate the wrong that has been done, as is presup- 
posed by the fact that forgiveness is compatible with punishment. A parent 
may forgive a child some wrongdoing and yet, consistently with forgiving, 
insist on punishing the child, perhaps for the child's own good or even 
because s/he deserves it. But punishing a debtor is incompatible with truly 
absolving him or her of debt. Thus, people need not forswear the judgment 
that they have been wrongfully harmed in order to forgive wrongdoers. The 
victim who overcomes anger yet retains the belief that she or he has been 
wronged and that therefore a continued association with the wrongdoer 
would be unwise may not have forgiven the wrongdoer. In the absence of 
further information we cannot know whether forgiveness has occurred in 
such cases. Our inability in such cases to distinguish forgiveness from other 
forms of morally motivated overcoming of resentment does not entail that 
the difference between them is a function of whether certain beliefs have 
been abandoned. To Hampton's question: "if forgivers never give up the 
idea that the action was wrong, how can they ever give up the view of the 
actor as a wrongdoer?" I answer that they need not do so. The question 
itself assumes that the belief that another has wronged you entails the belief 
that the actor is a wrongdoer. In one way, this is quite right. A wrongdoer is 
338 
one who has committed a wrong act. In a quite different sense, a wrongdoer 
is one who commits wrong acts; who is, in other words, on balance a 
wrongdoer. But this judgment, which Hampton may be relying upon in her 
claim that forgiveness involves repudiating the belief that the other is a 
wrongdoer (a "terrible" person), is not entailed by the belief that another 
has wrongfully harmed one. Hence, forgiving another need not involve 
abandoning the belief that the other is a wrongdoer. 
Hampton's purpose in stressing the need for overcoming both resentment 
and the judgment of the offender as a wrongdoer is to show that even this 
apparently stronger definition of forgiveness is inadequate, for it fails to 
express the "change of heart" involved in forgiveness. This is so, for the 
definition of forgiveness as overcoming resentment and forswearing the 
belief that the offender is a wrongdoer, even when done for moral reasons, 
does not enable us to distinguish forgiveness from the morally dubious 
phenomenon of condonation; an essential difference between these is that 
forgiveness involves a change of heart whereas condonation does not. 
Consider the following case: 
A woman marries a man with a stem, rather rigid father who is getting 
on in years. The father comes to stay with the couple for a visit, and finds 
his daughter-in-law's conduct irritating, the food less than perfect, the 
house less than clean, the conversation rather dull; in small ways he 
makes it clear that he considers the daughter-in-law to blame for the 
imperfections in his son's house. Whatever the motivations for the old 
man's attacks, let us suppose that they are unfair and give pain to the 
danghter-in-law. However, her husband says to her: "Look, he is my 
father and we should be on good terms with him. I know you think he is 
behaving badly, but be good and forgive him so that family peace can be 
preserved. ''8 
Hampton claims that were the woman to "drop" her judgment that the 
father-in-law is a wrongdoer and overcome the accompanying resentment 
for moral reasons (for the sake of preserving family harmony) she would be 
condoning, not forgiving, the wrongful behavior of her father-in-law. Thus 
the definition of forgiveness as the morally motivated overcoming of 
resentment and forswearing the judgment of another as a wrongdoer is 
incomplete, for it leaves us unable to distinguish forgiveness from condona- 
tion. 
If forgiveness does not require that we renounce the judgment that our 
transgressors are wrongdoers, then we have no difficulty in distinguishing 
forgiveness from condonation. Renouncing the judgment that a transgressor 
is a wrongdoer is necessary for the form of condonation at issue. One way a 
person condones the wrongdoing of others is when the person overcomes 
resentment toward them and abandons the belief that they are wrongdoers. 
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But this is required neither of forgiveness nor of another form of morally 
motivated overcoming of resentment. Suppose the woman in the aforemen- 
tioned scenario retains the belief that her father-in-law is a wrongdoer yet 
lets go of her resentment for moral reasons (for the sake of preserving 
family harmony). This may be a case of making the best of a bad situation. 
Accepting the fact that nothing can realistically be done about unpleasant 
circumstances need not be either forgiveness o r  condonation. I am at a loss 
as to what to call whatever people do when they do not condone and do not 
forgive, but surely there is middle ground here. 
Hampton's view is complex and interesting, and many of the observa- 
tions she makes about what she calls "moral hatred" are similar to what I 
have said here about "moral anger." One difference between her view and 
mine is that on her view overcoming the judgment of another as a 
wrongdoer is essential to forgiveness, while on my view it is not. Overcom- 
ing resentment for moral reasons may not be the whole story of forgiveness, 
but forswearing the belief that the offender is a wrongdoer is not among the 
missing elements. 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that forgiveness paradigmatically involves overcoming moral 
anger, of which resentment is the central case. I have argued, as well, that 
forgiveness may involve overcoming any form of anger so long as the 
belief that you have been wrongfully harmed is partially constitutive of it, 
and that overcoming other negative emotions caused by a wrongdoer's 
misdeed may, given appropriate qualifications, count as forgiveness. Those 
qualifications indicate, however, significant differences between moral 
anger and other negative emotions; differences which must be taken into 
account when determining whether overcoming negative emotions other 
than moral anger count as forgiveness. I have proposed, too, that forgive- 
ness requires neither overcoming all negative feelings (other than moral 
anger) nor the judgment that the offender is a wrongdoer. 
I must acknowledge that my analysis is incomplete, focusing as it does 
on the forgiver rather than on the person forgiven. After all, there are two 
sides to forgiveness. Not all forgiving involves a struggle to overcome 
negative feelings; sometimes it is a social transaction of a more casual sort 
that is effected by the simple speech act "I forgive you." My analysis is 
incomplete insofar as it treats exclusively of forgiveness as a process and 
fails to offer an analysis of forgiveness as an act. Finally, a complete theory 
of forgiveness requires an account of the conditions under which forgive- 
ness qualifies as a moral virtue, and such an account is beyond the scope of 
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this essay. Though I have not offered a complete theory of  forgiveness, my 
effort to clarify a dimension of what is involved in a common type of 
forgiveness may clear the way for answering related questions about it, and 
thereby lead to a fuller account of forgiveness as a moral phenomenon. 
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